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Resumen
La historia fiscal de Boyacá entre 1863 y 1886 reflejó la tensión entre la realidad de la economía 
moribunda del Estado y los ideales progresistas de los liberales radicales que controlaron su 
gobierno. El Estado se apoyó en tributos utilizados en el pasado colonial, como el de degüello, 
y en innovaciones liberales, como el impuesto directo, que proveyó una fuente de ingreso 
sorprendentemente efectiva para una economía subdesarrollada. El patrón de gasto público 
reflejó la misma tensión dinámica: los costos presupuestados fueron ajustados en línea con los 
recursos miserables del Estado, que en términos per cápita estaban entre los más bajos de la 
Confederación. Esta restricción operó cuando se trató de educación, una prioridad del gobierno, 
pero alcanzó un punto extremo con la fracasada Ferrería de Samacá. Detrás de estos esquemas 
ambiciosos y de alto costo estaban las promesas de apoyo financiero del Gobierno Federal, 
aunque no es claro qué tan frecuentemente esas promesas se cumplieron. Esta dinámica fue 
un factor en la compleja fórmula política en la que Boyacá era un puntal de apoyo del pequeño 
La historia fiscal de Boyacá, 1863-1886: 
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círculo liberal que controlaba el Gobierno Federal, aun cuando sus políticos se quejaban de que 
Cundinamarca impedía el desarrollo de Boyacá.
Palabras clave: Boyacá, Colombia, historia fiscal.
Códigos JEL: N26. 
Abstract
Between 1863 and 1886 Boyacá fiscal history reflected the inherent tension between the 
reality of the State’s moribund economy and the progressive ideals of the radical Liberals who 
controlled the government. For revenue the government relied on rents evoking the colonial 
past, such as the degüello, and liberal innovations, such as the impuesto directo, which proved 
a surprisingly effective source of income given the undeveloped economy. The pattern of gov-
ernment expenditure also reflected this dynamic tension. Expected costs were generally kept in 
line with the state’s paltry resources, which per capita were among the lowest of the nation. This 
restraint wavered when it came to education, a priority for the government, and disappeared 
completely at the prospect of a modern industrial infrastructure. The government sponsored 
attempts to build better roads or railroads, but reached an extreme with the doomed Ferrería 
de Samacá. Behind such ambitious and costly schemes were promises of financial support from 
the Federal Government, though it is not clear how often these promises were kept. This dy-
namic was a factor in the complex political formula wherein Boyacá was a stalwart supporter 
of the Liberal clique that controlled the Federal government even as its politicians inveighed 
against Cundinamarca as a State impeding Boyacense development.
Keywords: Boyaca, Colombia, fiscal history.
JEL Codes: N26.
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Introduction
The history of Boyacá during the Federal period embodies both the longer arcing trends 
that defined the region’s entire nineteenth century and, in a number of ways, the history of the 
nation. Its reflection of Boyacá’s nineteenth century is evident in the desperate attempt to pro-
mote economic development, and the gulf between elite political ambitions and social reality. 
Further, the limited scholarly understanding of Boyacense history between 1863 and 1886 re-
flects the underdeveloped historiography on politics and economics in Boyacá throughout the 
nineteenth century. This lacunae renders any investigation of the State during the Federal era 
useful in that it presents vital information, but it ensures that the tentative conclusions drawn 
from such investigations circle back to larger, as yet, unanswered questions. Thus an examina-
tion of Boyacá’s fiscal history provides information on State revenue and politics, and serves to 
identify important areas for future investigation. In the national panorama, Boyacá’s federal his-
tory embodied the general tension between visions of economic modernity promoted by the 
radical Liberals in power and the realities of an economically backward nation. Arguably, there 
was nowhere in the nation where this tension was as pronounced as in Boyacá; the home of key 
contributors to the Liberal project of the moment and the region with, perhaps, the least eco-
nomic potential for development.
In the years that followed Independence Boyacá began to gain a reputation as a place of 
faded glory. Both contemporary observers and historians compared the splendor of Colonial 
Tunja and Republican Boyacá, with the later suffering in the comparison. The decline of textile 
production after Independence is often cited as the catalyst for this decline, though in later dec 
ades the lack of any agricultural production suitable for export was also noted.1 Neither the 
modest attempts at reform in the second quarter of the century, nor Liberal reforms of mid-cen-
tury, impacted this state of affairs. At the beginning of the Federal era, the State government 
faced the same challenges to economic productivity and fiscal stability that had bedeviled its 
predecessors for half a century. The contrast between the inclinations of the radical Liberals 
who controlled the State and the economic realities of the Boyacá they sought to transform, 
was a defining characteristic of this history.2 The details of how the progressive elite managed a 
rural state with a large population is not completely understood, though controlling elections 
and drawing on support from Liberal networks outside of Boyacá were clearly elements in the 
system of control. A full examination of how this dynamic shaped Boyacense history requires 
further archival research and a more complete understanding of the State’s internal political 
dynamics than is currently available, though the general nature of its politics are well known. 
1 For works emphasizing that the decline in textile production after Independence see Hermes Tovar Pinzón, “La 
lenta ruptura con el pasado colonial (1810–1850),” Historia Económica de Colombia, ed. José Antonio Ocampo 
(Bogotá: Siglo XIX, 1987), 87–118; Luis Corsi Otálora, Boyacá: Atlántida andina (Tunja: Academia Boyacense de 
Historia, 2005); and Maurice Philip Brungardt, “Tithe Production and Patterns of Economic Change in Central 
Colombia, 1764-1883” (PhD diss., University of Texas, 1974). 
2  Works on the intellectual contributions of Liberals from the State is one of the better developed areas of 
Boyacense historiography, see Javier Ocampo López, Los hombres y las ideas en Boyacá (Tunja: Publicaciones 
de UPTC, 1989); and Julio Mondragón Castañeda, Las ideas de paz y de constitucionalidad de los adalides boya-
censes en el radicalismo colombiano, 1850–1885: con el texto de la Constitución Política para el Estado de Boyacá 
(Septiembre 3 de 1869) (Tunja: Publicaciones del Magister en Historia, UPTC, 1991).
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A few points on both Boyacá’s internal variation and place within the national poli-
tical system facilitate the understanding of this history. Though the Province of Tunja 
dates back to the sixteenth century, its recomposition as the State of Boyacá occurred 
in 1857 when the provinces of Tunja, Tundama, Casanare, and the cantons of Chin-
quinquirá and Moniquirá from the antigua provincia of Velez, were merged. Interna-
lly these provinces were reorganized as Tunja, Tundama, Oriente, and Casanare. After 
the passage of the Constitution of Rionegro in 1863, another reorganization divided 
the State into the Departments of Centro, Tundama, Norte, Nordeste, Oriente y Occi-
dente. After 1880 Nordeste was replaced with the Department and Gutierrez, and a 
few years later the Department of Sugamuxi was created. Tunja remained the political 
center of the State, but did not wield sufficient power to control the population cen-
ters of Sogamoso, Soatá, Santa Rosa, Duitama, or Chinquinquirá. At various moments 
these centers, which were richer and more economically vital than the capital, defied 
Tunja’s political authority.
Boyacá’s place within national politics is more clearly understood. During the Federal era, as 
was the case for much of its history, the regime in Tunja was a firm ally of the national govern-
ment in Bogotá. At times coexistence with the national government and its powerful Liberal 
neighbors of Cundinamarca and Santander weighed heavily on Boyacá, while at others the re-
lationships were viewed favorably by those who felt themselves the rightful rulers of the prov-
ince. A key result of this political allegiance is that Boyacá single presidential vote would be used 
to support appropriate Liberal candidates. On occasion Boyacá was transformed into a place 
of campaigns and battles, but even when wars were fought elsewhere the conflicts affected 
economic development, the management of revenue, and, as the State provided more than its 
share of soldiers, the available labor pool.3 During the 1850s there had been artisans’ societies 
in a number of the larger towns, and a few were centers of Melista support during the war that 
followed April 17, 1854.4 How much of this Draconian political support survived into the Federal 
era; in what form and whether its adherents supported the State government after 1863 is not 
clear. Further, the role of the State’s campesino majority, beyond their fabled allegiance to the 
Church and their apocryphal status as cannon fodder in civil wars remains a stereotype that has 
not been sufficiently investigated.5
However, it is evident that maintaining Liberal control over the state, and ensuring its vote 
in national elections, was a priority for the regime, though the degree that this control involved 
suppressing popular will or apportioning rent seeking between regionally based groups is not 
clear. A mix of both was probably involved. This system had its costs and its weaknesses. The 
clearest demonstration of this system, and its costs, took place in 1871 when the government 
3 Felipe Pérez argued that the reliance on Boyacense soldiers served as an impediment to their development as 
citizens as well, Memoria de Gobernador de Boyacá de 1870, 10. The timing of the rebellion suggests that it was 
in part a response to the education reform of 1870, but this was not mentioned as a factor in any pronounce-
ment or article. On the reform see Jane Meyer Loy, “Education during the Colombian Federation: The School 
Reform of 1870,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 51:2 (May, 1971), 275-294.
4 Rosenthal, Salt and the Colombian State, 102-3.
5 For an analysis on this point see Dueñas Vargas, Guillermo. “Algunas hipótesis para el estudio de la resistencia campe-
sina en la región central de Colombia, siglo XIX.” Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura 2 (1992): 90–106.
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of Felipe Pérez, a proponent of progress who sought to limit the role of the Church in public life, 
was temporarily overthrown by a revolt led by Policarpo Flores.6 The revolt began as a local ris-
ing in late 1870, and by 1871 Flores had succeeded in taking control over the State government. 
What prompted the rebellion is not exactly clear. During their brief reign in power, the rebels 
were careful not to articulate a partisan agenda, stressing that their regime would reflect the 
will of all Boyacenses though fair and open elections, in contrast to Pérez’s government.7
Most of the information about the rebellion come from newspapers in Bogotá, where the 
Liberal establishment observed the rebellion with particular interest. The editors of El Tiempo 
acknowledged that the complaints over electoral fraud under Pérez were just, but dedicated 
more attention to how the rebellion would impact Boyacá’s vote in the upcoming presidential 
election.8 Various pieces in the Bogotá press expressed concerns over the warlike indigenous 
population so close to the national capital and the possibility that clergy might whip them 
into a frenzy.9 Though the Federal government was legally prohibited from interfering in State 
politics, it was clear that a hostile, or even neutral, regime in nearby Tunja was unacceptable.10 
With support in Cundinamarca Pérez raised an army to retake Boyacá.11 By May he had 
defeated a major rebel force and re-established control over the State shortly thereafter.12 After 
retaking power, Pérez resigned. While his successor Vicente Rueda struck a conciliatory tone, 
repressive measures followed. In the next presidential elections, Boyacá cast its vote for Manuel 
Murillo Toro.13 The revolt was a minor affair, but it demonstrates the tensions at the heart of 
the Boyacense political economy. Despite Rueda’s conciliatory tone, his restored government 
published various accounts of a battle in Paipa that detailed, melodramatically, fires set during 
the conflict. Pronouncements of victory and descriptions of the town as a smoking ruin, were 
supported by eye witness accounts from Paipa who described an army that included priests 
6 On Pérez see Ocampo López, Los hombres y las ideas en Boyacá, 11. For another example of Boyacense radi-
calism see the Memoria de Gobernador de Boyacá de 1869. For a letter from the jefe politico of the Departmen-
to del Norte describing local priests agitating against the government and handing out ballots during elec-
tions see AGN, SR, Ministerio de Interior #75, F. 842, February 1868. In a less sensational coup, a decade later 
the State President was temporarily imprisoned by the leader of the fuerza publica Marco Naranjo in April 
1883. For notes on this attempted golpe from the Federal government and Santander in support of Aristides 
Calderón who had returned to power see El Boyacense, May 8, 1883.
7 On reports of conflicts in the region and concern that it would spread, see El Boyacense, December 31, 1870. 
On the outbreak of the rebellion, see Diario de Cundinamarca, January 1871; Diario de Cundinamarca, January 
18, 1871, Ibid, January 25, 1871; and El Tiempo, February 28 & March 7, 1871. For opinion in Bogotá that was 
critical of Pérez, but more so of the rebels see El Tiempo, December 5, 1871; and Ibid, May 9, 1871. On the mil-
itary oligarchy of Boyacá see Ibid, April 18, 1871.
8 Quoted in El Tiempo, March 28, 1871, “Revista” as is the following quote.
9 El Tiempo, April 18, 1871.
10 Several peace commissions from Bogotá failed, Ibid, April 11, 1871; and April 25, 1871. See also Diario de Cun-
dinamarca, April 13, 1871.
11 April 4, and April 18, 1871.
12 See El Tiempo, and Diario de Cundinamarca, April 14, 1871. For a proclamation after the victory, see El Boya-
cense, May 31, 1871.
13 El Tiempo, August 22, 1871. On forced loans, the role of Boyacá, and peace commissions, see Eduardo Posa-
da-Carbó, “Elections and Civil Wars in Nineteenth-Century Colombia: The 1875 Presidential Campaign,” Jour-
nal of Latin American Studies, 26:3 (October, 1994), 621-649. 
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and indios, invoking the fear that the church would lead an ignorant peasantry in rebellion. 
Controlling such forces was a necessary prerequisite for allowing the State to reach its potential 
and far more important than free elections. 
While the revolt was a dramatic illustration of the political forces in Boyacá it did not have 
a measurable impact on the State’s economy. In contrast, the War of 1876-7 had a significant 
impact on the economy and illustrates how the State was affected by national conflicts even 
though the fighting involved disorder in the western provinces rather than major battles. Re-
ports indicate Boyacá contributed a disproportionate number of combatants to the army, creat-
ing a labor shortage.14 Further the national government sought to finance the war from its po-
litical base with Decree 472 on August 30, 1876 calling for a forced loan to be collected: 400,000 
pesos in Cundinamarca; and 200,000 in Tolima, Santander, and Boyacá respectively.15 However, 
the governments of Boyacá, and Santander refused to collect the loan. Simultaneously, insur-
gents destroyed cadastral surveys further inhibiting the government’s ability to collect reve-
nue.16 Boyacá low rate of revenue collection following the war testify that the conflict had a sig-
nificant impact on Boyacá’s economy, with returns from the impuesto directo sinking to some 
of their lowest of the entire era.
Boyacá’s economy
Boyacá’s economy was primarily agricultural. Major crops were barley, maíz, potatoes, wheat, 
and beans. While much of the best agricultural land had been in resguardos controlled by indig-
enous communities in the Colonial era, resettlement campaigns in the late eighteenth century 
and repartimiento in the early Republic meant that by 1863 this was no longer the case. In his 
seminal study Hombre y Tierra en Boyacá, Orlando Fals Borda linked the plague of minifundia to 
the dispossession and repartimiento.17 Though Fals Borda was concerned largely with the twen-
tieth century his observations apply to the nineteenth century as well.
 A district survey from 1845 offers an overview on occupation by canton (see Table 1).
14 Park, Rafael Núñez, 168. On Boyacá contributing more soldiers to national military efforts than other states, 
see María Victoria Dotor Robayo, “Soldados indios: la ‘cuota de sangre’ del Estado Soberano de Boyacá en el 
proceso de formación del Ejército Federal y del Ejército de la Unión Colombiana,” Revista de Historia Regional 
y Local, 4:8 (2012), 73-107.
15 Januario Salgar, Memoria de Hacienda y Fomento de 1877, 9-10.
16 Giovanni Fernando Amado-Oliveros, “Estructura administrativa del Estado Soberano de Boyacá (1857-1886),” 
Estudios Socio-Jurid., 11:1 (Enero-Junio, 2009), 167-8.
17 Orlando Fals Borda, El hombre y la tierra en Boyacá. Bases sociohistóricas para una reforma agraria (Ediciones 
Documentos Colombianos, 1957).
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Table 1. Occupation by Canton in Boyacá in 1845.18
Landowners Laborers Traders Artisans
Centro 2940 6039 630 1443
Leyva 1700 2310 118 59
Ramiriquí 1923 6095 145 163
Cocuy 1620 2065 60 103
Santa Rosa 835 3130 600 471
Soatá 334 3430 124 179
Sogamoso 4375 8085 1343 1520
Garagoa 379 3668 52 40
Tensa 403 6345 360 996
Total 14,509 41,167 3432 4974
The survey demonstrates significant variation from Garagoa and Tensa, where less than ten 
percent of the surveyed population were landowners, to Leiva where almost forty percent held 
land. By the survey, two thirds of Boyacá’s working male population were laborers, most in-
volved in agriculture. The nature of the conditions under which they were employed, and in 
what fashion they endured later in the century. A close look at landholding after the sale of old 
resguardo lands, ideally investigated in tandem with an examination of the cadastral surveys 
used as a basis for the impuesto directo, discussed below, will provide important information 
on the dynamics of Republican Boyacá.19 
The district survey of 1845 also describes widespread animal husbandry, though no particu-
lar area seemed to have a robust ranching sector. Low level, small scale textile production was 
also widespread. There were few areas of concentrated production with the exception of Santa 
Rosa and Belén, which were listed as producing 50,000 and 20,000 tejas respectively. Though 
Boyacá had various mineral resources, the survey indicated little active mining. There was a 
mine owner in Ganchantivá, another in Guayata, and two in Tenza. Only Gachantivá had “min-
ers,” listed under occupation, with 20. The addition of Muzo to the state with the incorporation 
of parts of Vélez in 1857 in theory brought the famous wealth of the emerald mines to Boyacá, 
but there is no record that this sector contributed to the larger economy. A number of reports 
refer to interprovincial trade, generally in the border regions with Santander, Cundinamarca, 
and Casanare. These economic profiles of these areas had more in common with their provincial 
neighbors, as was demonstrated by Santa Rosa’s textile production, which was more in keeping 
with Santander than the rest of Boyacá.20
18 The survey was produced by local officials in response from a questioner sent by the Governor. With a popu-
lation reported at over 330,000 in 1843 this survey was not exhaustive.
19 To offer one example, the repartimiento de resguardo de Siachoque, a town near Tunja, involved various law 
suits and land sales by those who received part of the old resguardo continued for several decades. A thor-
ough accounting in the notarial records of the Archivo Regional de Boyacá, where there are legajos of notarial 
records dedicated to these affairs and other legajos, such as Notario Segundo #292 documenting a burst of 
such sales in 1860, to consult. 
20 William McGreevey reports that the cost of shipping cargo between Bogotá and Tunja was one of the cheapest 
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Despite the economic reforms of mid-century, this profile was more or less in place when 
the State was created in 1857. One official wrote described the state’s fiscal affairs by observing 
that neither Tundama nor Casanare were capable of covering their expenses, and that proper-
ly speaking Tunja didn’t have any rents, just large debts.21 There is no clear indication that this 
profile disheartened those seeking economic modernization, nor is there evidence that the ma-
jority of Boyacá’s population shared the enthusiasm for, or belief in the power of, fiscal reform 
to transform society. The contrast between the impulse toward economic modernity and the 
State’s poverty, was evident in the profile of revenue streams exploited by Tunja, proposed bud-
gets, and unrealized plans to build infrastructure and foment industry.22
One indication of Boyacá’s economic stagnation and poverty was its slow rate of population 
growth, one of the lowest of the nation (see Table 2).
Table 2. Population growth by state, 1851-1898.23
Province 1851 1898 Increase
Antioquia 243,388 620,000 255%
Bolívar 205,607 375,000 182%
Boyacá 379,682 685,000 180%
Cauca 323,574 800,000 247%
Cundinamarca 317,351 630,000 199%
Magdalena 67,764 132,000 195%
Panamá 138,108
Santander 360,148 550,000 153%
Tolima 208,108 380,000 183%
TOTAL 2,243,730 4,183,000 186%
Whether the demographic stagnation was caused by civil war, out migration, or existing 
poverty, it factored into the lack of economic vitality.
Rents & expenses
Boyacá’s relatively low population growth was matched by its inability to generate signif-
icant revenue. Between 1848 and 1872 Boyacá collected, on average, less in pesos than any 
per kilometer in Colombia during the nineteenth-century, McGreevey, An Economic History of Colombia 1845-
1930, 43-5.
21 AGN, SR, Gobernación de Tequendama, Santander, y Boyacá, leg. 1, fol. 613, October 1857.
22 Salomón Kalmanovitz and Edwin López Rivera, “Las finanzas públicas de la Confederación Granadina y los Es-
tados Unidos de Colombia 1850-1886,” Revista de Economía Institucional, 12:23 (segundo semestre/2010), 199-
228; and Liliana Guatava Alarcón, “Las finanzas públicas del Estado Soberano de Boyacá: 1857-1886.” Trabajo 
de grado para economista, Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 2011.
23 Alarcón, 92, Anexo L.
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other State except for Magdalena.24 But accounting for Boyacá’s larger population renders this 
return shockingly low as its per-capita returns lagged far behind even other poor performing 
states. For examples, in 1870 Cauca, Tolima, and Santander, collected roughly .40 pesos per res-
ident, while in Boyacá the amount was only .20 pesos per resident (see Table 3).25
Table 3. Per capita rents by state 1870/71.26
Población 1870 Ingresos 1871 Per capita ingresos in pesos
Antioquia 365,974 343,546 .95
Bolívar 241,704 233,250 .97
Boyacá 498,541 104,600 .21
Cauca 435,078 212,232 .48
Cundinamarca 413,658 341,220 .82
Magdalena 82,255 70,939 .86
Panamá 224,032 296,349 1.32
Santander 433,178 186,889 .43
Tolima 230,891 117,995 .51
Though the government seemed to keep anticipated revenue in mind when setting presu-
puestos for the coming year, it only managed to record surpluses in eight years of this period, 
while running deficits in seventeen (see Table 4).27
Table 4. Annual revenue 1857-1886.28
Año Rentas Gastos Déficit Superávit
1857 73.158,0 72.374,4 783,6
1858 74.485,8 74.635,7 149,9
1859 50.671,0 84.315,7 33.644,7
1860 72.452,0 136.401,5 63.949,5
1862 50.671,0 84.315,7 33.644,7
1863 81.677,2 94.193,7 12.516,5
1864 93.200,0 99.812,6 6.612,6
24 Kalmanovitz & López Rivera, “Las finanzas públicas de la Confederación Granadina,” 213.
25 Boyacá had also been the lowest in per capita revenue collection in 1858 and 1851, Ibid, 212. Alarcón’s tables 
make it clear that these figures were typical for Boyacá during this era. Alarcón, “Las finanzas públicas del Es-
tado Soberano de Boyacá,” anexos m & n.
26 Jorge Orlando Melo, (1987), “Las vicisitudes del modelo liberal, 1850-1988”, en Ocampo José Antonio (compil.) 
Historia económica de Colombia. Editorial Siglo XXI, Bogotá.
27 Alarcón, “Las finanzas públicas del Estado Soberano de Boyacá: 1857-1886,” 9 & Anexo A.
28 Ibid, 80, Anexo B.
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1865 120.280,0 120.604,1 324,1
1866 120.410,0 119.687,8 722,3
1867 100.415,0 198.158,3 97.743,3
1868 100.415,0 179.647,9 79.232,9
1869 126.554,9 198.530,8 71.975,9
1870 45.690,0 102.978,0 57.288,0
1871 96.138,5 70.912,3 25.226,2
1872 102.978,0 65.533,0 37.445,0
1873 381.041,2
1874 710.358,4 45.461,9
1875 82.540,1 67.829,1 14.711,0
1876 73.772,0 118.384,6 44.612,6
1877 181.474,8 266.880,4 85.405,6
1878 226.919,2 308.978,0 82.058,9
1879 564.898,7 406.504,0 158.394,7
1880 582.933,0 579.565,0 3.368,0
1881 597.399,0 686.530,6 89.131,6
1882 273.751,0 344.435,4 70.684,4
1883 278.840,0 391.535,0
1885 302.935,0 426.299,0 123.364,1
1886 377.562,8 306.219,7 71.343,1
A part from the tendency toward deficits, a review of revenue, expected revenue, costs, and 
expected costs shows an overall, if sporadic, increase in both revenue and spending (see Table 5).
Table 5. Rentas, gastos, and presupuestos.29
Rentas anuales en 
Pesos
Gastos anuales en 
Pesos
Presupuesto de 
rentas en Pesos
Presupuestos de 
gastos en Pesos
1857 73.158,00 72.374,40 107.576,09 79.611,84 
1858 74.489,80 74.635,72 74.229,46 82.928,60 
1859 59.686,09 84.315,72 74.509,80 93.167,72 
1860 72.202,66 136.401,50 72.202,66 72.857,41 
1862 50.671,00 84.315,72 74.509,80 93.167,72 
1863 81.677,20 94.193,65 81.399,50 94.193,65 
1864 93.200,00 99.812,55 81.677,20 103.389,85 
1865 120.280,00 120.604,05 120.860,00 99.819,85 
1866 120.410,00 119.687,75 120.068,86 179.697,85 
1867 100.415,00 198.158,25 100.415,00 179.647,85 
29 Alarcón 80-1, Anexo B. 
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1868 100.415,00 179.647,85 100.415,00 88.300,03 
1869 126.554,90 198.530,82 126.553,88 81.753,00 
1870 45.690,00 102.978,00 125.954,90 70.912,30 
1871 96.138,50 70.912,30 96.138,50 65.533,00 
1872 102.978,00 65.533,00 102.978,00 381.041,23 
1873 341.754,00 381.041,23 341.754,23 45.461,85 
1875 82.540,12 67.829,12 82.540,12 118.384,60 
1876 73.772,01 118.384,60 203.367,30 266.879,75 
1877 181.474,80 266.879,75 181.474,00 406.504,00 
1878 226.919,15 308.978,00 438.818,52 406.504,00 
1879 564.898,65 406.504,00 564.898,65 579.565,00 
1880 582.933,00 579.565,00 582.933,00 686.530,60 
1881 597.399,00 686.530,60 597.399,00 344.435,43
1882 179.000,00 344.435,43 273.751,00 391.535,00 
1883 278.840,00 391.535,00 278.840,00 
1886 377.562,75 306.219,65 555.206,02 306.219,65
One notable point here is that the State had difficulty in covering expenses from its forma-
tion in 1857 and was in debt before 1863. Also of note is that within the long term trend of in-
creased revenue and expenses, there were enormous fluctuations year to year. Here the early 
1870s stand out, with returns tripling from 102,978 pesos to 341, 754 pesos from 1872 to 1873, 
and then falling to 82,540.12 pesos in 1874. The increase was anticipated, as demonstrated by 
the 381,041.23 pesos given for the presupuesto of 1872 and expenses of 1873, but such ups 
and downs were not conducive to effective policy or development. The presupuesto for the fol-
lowing year was a modest 45.461,85. While some of these fluctuations and the general upward 
trend in revenue collection were products of factors endogenous to Boyacá, contributions from 
the Federal government were a notable factor in this inconsistency, a topic considered below.
While a survey of the main sources of State revenue, the impuesto directo, el estanco del 
aguardiente, papel sellado, and degüello does not explain such fluctuations it presents an over-
view of the most important sources of revenue (see Table 6).
Table 6. Rents in Boyacá, 1857 a 1886.30
Renta / 
año Aguardientes
Papel 
sellado Degüello
Impuesto 
directo
Instrumentos 
públicos % total
1857 46% 15% 39% 100%
1858 38% 28% 34% 100%
1859 43% 22% 22% 6% 100%
30 Alarcón, “Las finanzas públicas,” Anexo E, Tabla XII, 84. An important point here is that Alarcon’s data is derived 
from anual Memorias, though it is not clear how all of these figures were generated or whether they were 
completely accurate. Regular reporting published in El Boyacense presented a more complex portrait of short-
falls, incomplete returns, and attempts to collect certain rents for years.
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1860 37% 29% 33% 100%
1862 45% 35% 20% 100%
1863 42% 18% 39% 100%
1864 42% 18% 39% 100%
1865 20% 10% 60% 10% 100%
1866 20% 10% 47% 7% 100%
1867 20% 10% 47% 7% 100%
1868 24% 12% 56% 8% 100%
1869 32% 13% 41% 10% 100%
1870 30% 11% 50% 100%
1871 33% 12% 2% 52% 100%
1872 26% 12% 5% 56% 2% 100%
1873 75% 23% 0% 100%
1874 48% 10% 40% 100%
1875 86% 14% 0% 100%
1876 62% 24% 9% 0% 4% 100%
1877 50% 8% 3% 36% 2% 100%
1878 33% 13% 2% 52% 100%
1879 24% 10% 17% 47% 1% 100%
1880 24% 10% 17% 47% 1% 100%
1881 23% 9% 19% 46% 1% 100%
1882 22% 11% 15% 44% 2% 95%
1883 18% 12% 12% 36% 3% 82%
1885 20% 12% 24% 38% 4% 100%
1886 19% 12% 24% 38% 4% 100%
This list demonstrates the degree the government relied on both traditional and new sourc-
es of revenue. The impuesto directo, the single greatest source of revenue in this era, articulated 
the economic ideals trumpeted by the radicals in power. Though Boyacá’s poverty limited what 
such a tax produced, the success of the impuesto demonstrates the commitment to economic 
modernization, and the State’s surprising capacity to compile annual catastros articulating its 
institutional presence throughout Boyacá.31 In real terms the impuesto directo returned more 
revenue than any other rent. In assessing the returns for 1873, when the impuesto directo ac-
counted for 40 percent of Boyacá’s returns, Kalmanovitz and López Rivera term it a “relativo éxi-
to.”32 Though an accurate characterization, the assertion is contingent on comparisons with the 
states that did not successfully introduce an impuesto directo and, more significantly, the con-
text of fiscal scarcity. Had Boyacá’s per capita revenues approached those of other States, or if 
31 Giovanni Fernando Amado-Oliveros, “Estructura administrativa del Estado Soberano de Boyacá (1857-1886), 
(artículo de maestría), Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, 11: 1 (enero-junio 2009), 145-179, see 153. In some years it 
proved impossible to complete a catastro so the Government relied on figures from prior years, as it did in 
1877.
32 Kalmanovitz & López Rivera, “Las finanzas públicas de la Confederación Granadina,” 221.
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it had access to other sources of revenue, the impuesto would have been much less important. 
Another point is that the impuesto tended to fluctuate. Alarcón has suggested that provincial 
variation in the rate of assessment, noted in 1870, was a way for the State government to reward 
its allies and punish its opponents.33 It is difficult to prove or disprove this assertion, though the 
varying rate of assessment identified by Alarcón for 1870 did not last. By 1880 the rate was a 
uniform 4% as set by law (see Table 7).
Table 7. Impuesto directo para 1870 and 1880.34
1870 1880
Departamento Riqueza imponible Suma a contribuir % Riqueza imponible Suma a contribuir %
Tundama 5.075,770 8,177,55 1.6 4.552,755 18,211,15 4
Centro 3.109,879 8,604,2 2.7 4.291,507 17,166,05 4
Oriente 2.290,531 9,160,92 4 2.573,699 10,295,6 4
Occidente 2.126,992 8,968 4.2 2.851,284 11,405,15 4
Norte 1.782,297 8,486,54 4.8 1.320,082 5280,35 4
Nordeste 340,836 1,197 3.5 495,404 1981,65 4
Gutiérrez -  - - 1.058,070 4232,35 4
TOTAL 14,726,305 42,394,22 2.8 17.142,801 68,572,30 4
Other problems included the specter of corruption, and shortfalls in collection. While the 
former is difficult to document, the latter was clearly documented and a constant challenge. 
The effort to collect direct taxes in 1872 provides an example. After several years of declining re-
turns, and the disorder of 1871 described above, the government in Tunja sought to collect the 
impuesto of 1871 (here described as “ordinario”) an impuesto extraordinario, and an empréstito 
forzado. In March 1872, El Boyacense reported on collection rates for the three levies: 4019 of 
5378 pesos of the impuesto ordinario had been collected; but only 1017 of the 2030 for the im-
puesto extraordinario, and only 1160 of the 2903 of the empréstito forzoso.35
Also illuminating are reports from the 1880s that document inefficiencies in revenue 
collection, even during a half decade when the impuesto directo provides between 30% and 
50% of state revenue. An inspection of the office of the Hacienda in the Provincia del Centro in 
March 1882, and the Provincias del Tundama and Sugamaxi the following month, documented 
dramatic shortfalls in collection; in the Provincia del Centro only 1480.4 of the expected 24,571.8 
pesos had been collected at the time of the inspection (see Table 8).36
33 Alarcón, 32.
34 Alarcón, 32, & El Boyacense, August 14, 1880.
35 El Boyacense, March 6, 1872.
36  Ibid, March 31, 1882.
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Table 8. Impuesto expected and collected.37
1878 1879 1880 1881 1882
Pres. Coll. Pres. Coll. Pres. Coll. Pres. Coll. Pres. Coll.
Centro 1128.375 1.60 2473.775 121.10 3330.55 36.20 4414.70 418.075 13224.40 903.40
Sugamuxi y 
Tundama 41.425 1.40 1145.50 12.25 372.325 14.25 1460.80 244.90
While such anecdotal reports do not prove that the figures published in the Memorias were 
based more on presupuestos than reality, they indicate the degree that the fiscal system ran 
behind collection goals, and are a reminder that the entire system constantly teetering on the 
point of collapse. Certainly challenges to meeting presupuestos contributed to the trend of re-
turns failing to equal expenses. 
Despite such challenges the impuesto’s rate of return increased in the 1870s and 1880s (see 
Table 9). 
Table 9. Presupuesto impuesto directo by Province in pesos
Province Tundama Oriente Centro Occidente Norte Nordeste Gutiérrez Sugamuxi Total
1864 13050 8550 10050 7150 9200 48000
1865 19575 12825 15075 10725 13800 72000
1873 13934.2 6905.3 9864.15 8149.13 5526.5 44379.3
1874 13610.25 7056.15 10,023.15 8422.05 5870 1027.4 46009
1875 13610.3 7253.33 10095 8974.38 5945.25 1043.6 46921.8
1876 13666.5 7309.65 10575.85 9745.675 6226.525 1384.4 48908.8
1877 13866.5 7309.65 10575.85 9745.675 6,226.53 1384.6 49,108.80
1878 18487.65 9852.6 15170.15 12993.35 8237.7 1968.7 66710.15
1880 18211.2 10295.6 17166.1 11405.2 5280.35 1981.65 4232.35 68572.3
1881 18322 10300 17392 11653 5465.3 1981.7 4314.7 69428
1882 13054.5 10163.7 14910.3 12476.6 6080.9 3921.6 9282.2 69889.8
In part this increase was due to raising the rate of assessment to 4% of wealth in 1878. This 
change was particularly notable in the provinces of Centro and Tundama, the largest and 
wealthiest in the State. Prior low rates of assessment in these areas may have been the product 
of political influence, so the reform reflected the implementation of a more regionally equita-
37  El Boyacense, March 31, 1882 & April 4, 1882.
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ble rent. But the increase also stemmed from the rise in assessed wealth across the State, from 
14,726,305 pesos in 1870 to 17,142,801 pesos in 1880 (see Table 6). Reflecting on similar increas-
es across the nation in this era, Kalmanovitz and López cite increased transportation infrastruc-
ture and rising rates of education as leading to rising levels of wealth.38
In contrast to the innovative impuesto directo, there were the rents directly descended from 
those of the colonial era. The enduring reliance on traditional revenue sources may have been 
ill suited to the dominated ideology of the era, but the practice was born of economic necessity. 
Aguardiente was the most important of these anachronistic rents, supplying between a quar-
ter and half of State revenue depending on the year. The importance of this contribution was 
enhanced as aguardiente provided revenue in years when the impuesto did not. For example, 
in five years during the 1870s aguardiente provided 75% (1873), 48% (1874), 86% (1875), 62% 
(1876), and 50% (1877) of the State’s total revenue, returning between 24,000 and 38,000 pe-
sos. Anecdotally both the impuesto directo and aguardiente proved easier to manage and col-
lect earlier in the federal era. An 1867 report from Tundama noted that collectors had returned 
7037.15 pesos though the presupuesto had stipulated only 6751.2 pesos.39 Such excesses were 
unusual, and Alarcón has documented the increasing gap between expected and actual returns 
as time passed.40
Even more descriptive of Boyacá’s retrograde economy was the reintroduction of the de-
güello tax after 1870. In the decade-and-a-half after this backward looking innovation, the pre-
supuesto for the degüello went through three distinct states: below 10,000 pesos in the 1870s; 
around 25,000 pesos from 1880-1883; and over 40,000 pesos in 1885 and 1886. The average 
annual return for these years was 16,145 pesos per year. This high average reflected the rela-
tive success of the rent after 1880, when it returned roughly the same amount as aguardiente. 
Whether this increase was a product of increased institutional efficiency on the part of the Ha-
cienda or represented an increase in Boyacá’s role as a transit point for cattle from the Llanos is 
unclear, though the question remains ripe for investigation. Like the degüello the endurance of 
colonial style taxes on papel sellado and instrumentos continued to provide small but neces-
sary government funds throughout the Federal era.
One of the most important elements of Boyacá’s fiscal history is what was missing, the taxes 
that the State government could not exploit as they were the province of the Federal govern-
ment. Aduanas, which by virtue of its proximity to Venezuela, might have had some impact was 
outside of its control, though not much international trade made its way through Boyacá. More 
significant, in potential and in practice, was the Federal salt monopoly. Just as the State was 
unable to break away from colonial revenues, the Federal government maintained monopoly 
control over the production and sale of salt even through the zenith of Liberal political control. 
38  It is also possible that the property controlled by the Church and other institutions had a significant impact 
on the economy once it was brought into circulation, though as was the case with other indicators Boyacá 
was a secondary area in this dynamic. See Roberto Luis Jaramillo & Adolfo Meisel Roca, “Más allá de la retóri-
ca de la reacción, análisis económico de la desamortización en Colombia, 1861-1888,” Cuadernos de Historia 
Económica y Empresarial (Cartagena: Banco de la República/Centro de Estudios Económicos Regionales,) #22 
(December 2008). (http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/chee_22.pdf )
39 El Boyacense, May 14, 1867.
40 Alarcón 36.
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While, the promise and frustrations of the salt monopoly for the national government were a 
constant throughout the nineteenth century, for Cundinamarca and Boyacá the anachronistic 
and anti-liberal monopoly deprived them of a share of the most profitable industry in their re-
spective states.41 Between 1855 and 1897 the profits from sales in Zipaquirá, Nemocón, Tausa, 
and Sesquilé in Cundinamarca averaged 660,360 pesos annually; while profits in Chameza and 
La Salina in Boyacá averaged 60,192, a sum roughly equivalent to returns for the impuesto di-
recto after 1878.
In response to critiques of the monopoly, the Ministerio de Hacienda implemented various 
reforms in this era. One introduced a system of libre elaboración, which theoretically allowed 
for market forces to improve the manufacture and sale of salt.42 More importantly for Boyacá, 
in 1869 the Hacienda revised its fiscal code setting aside ½ centavo per kilogram sold in gov-
ernment almacenes for a fund to be distributed to those states where the monopoly was still 
in effect: 35% for Boyacá, 30% for Cundinamarca, 22% for Santander, 10% for Tolima, and 3% 
for Cauca.43 This revenue should have provided a substantial contribution to Boyacá, but cor-
respondence makes it clear that the salt administration did not always send the money owed 
to the State. The presupuesto for 1880 noted that the Hacienda owed the State 70,000 pesos 
due to previous failures to forward the funds.44 By the 1880s profits from the monopoly were 
linked directly to the development of a modern industrial infrastructure, and the will to abolish 
the monopoly had waned even before the Constitution of 1886 and the end of the Federal era.
Costs & spending
A review of government expenses and spending describes the same tug of war between 
liberal ideals and fiscal reality evident in the mixed sources of revenue. The presupuestos de 
gastos shows that the government attempted to spend no more than it took in. The practical 
side of this approach was evident in the modest allocations set for each year. The government 
of Boyacá spent less, in total, than any other state in the nation, except for Tolima and Magdale-
41 See Joshua M. Rosenthal, Salt and the Colombian State. Local Society and Regional Monopoly, 1821-1900 (Pitts-
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012).
42  Ibid, 47-9, 63-71. 
43 Boyacá was owed as much as 1500 pesos a month from this fund. For example, in 1875 the fund should have 
allocated 194,058 pesos as follows: Boyacá 24,935, Cauca 2,137, Cundinamarca 21,373, Santander 15,673, and 
Tolima; Esguerra, Memoria de Hacienda y Fomento de 1876, 37. For related legislation, see Lei de 15 de abril de 
1872 por la cual se ordena el pago de las cantidades que el Tesoro nacional debe a ciertos Estados por la partici-
pación que tienen en la renta de Salinas, Aquileo Parra, Memoria de Hacienda y Fomento de 1873, 41. Given the 
general inefficiency associated with the monopoly and almacenes, it is not clear that all of these funds were 
delivered. More subtly the networks used to distribute profits from salt works reinforced Liberal political con-
trol, as in the 1860s military commanders wrote directly to empleados of the Hacienda in charge of La Salina 
seeking funds for their military operation. The infrastructure was national but the dynamic underscored the 
presence of the Liberal government even during an era of high federalism, see Rosenthal, Salt and the Colom-
bian State, 118-119.
44 It was listed as “Deuda de la Nación al Estado por la participación que este tiene en la renta de Salinas, y que 
se ha dejado de pagar en años anteriores,” Ley 34 de 1879, El Boyacense, December 18, 1879.
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na, though neither had a population as large as Boyacá.45 Notably the periods of war, whether 
national wars as in 1860 and 1877, or provincial rebellions as in 1871, did not produce deficits 
greater than those of other years. This is best understood as indicative of the general inefficien-
cy of revenue collection during war or peace, rather than a testament to the efficiency of the 
government during war.
While the government was generally circumspect in its expectations and projections for costs 
and expenses, it failed to exercise such restraint in two crucial areas. The first was education, an 
area where the government invested considerable funds and energy. This effort included the 
support of universal primary education and for the state’s institutions of higher education; the 
Colegio de Boyacá and the Instituto Agrícola de Boyacá. Still, Boyacá spent less on education 
per capita than any other state, and allotted a smaller percentage of its annual presupuesto for 
education than every state but Magdalena and Panama (see Table 10).
Table 10. Education spending by state.46
Presupuesto 
instrucción pública, 
1871 in pesos
Per capita spending 
on instrucción pública 
in pesos 
(1870 population)
Instrucción 
pública as % 
of total presupuesto
Antioquia 17.764,00 .05 5.2%
Bolívar 48.147,00 .20 21.2%
Boyacá 4.496,00 .01 4.3%
Cauca 17.390,00 .04 6.9%
Cundinamarca 12,200.00 .03 4.1%
Magdalena 2000.00 .02 2.9%
Panamá 10.400,00 .05 3.0%
Santander 46.126,00 .11 21%
Tolima 9.750 .04 5.6%
Total 2.928.311 .06 8%
Despite these comparatively low levels of spending, the government of Boyacá made it clear 
that promoting education was a priority. El Boyacense was dominated by articles and whole issues 
reporting on schools and education, and revenue was earmarked to support education. An 1882 
report documented this process, with details on how each agencia de Hacienda ensured that 
money collected from the impuesto directo went directly to instrucción pública (see Table 11).
When the impuesto proved insufficient to cover educational expenses, additional funds were 
allocated from aguardiente, as was necessary in Tundama, Sugamuxi, and Oriente. Promoting 
education was a priority for the government, but one that was managed with an eye for the 
bottom line.
45 Kalmanovitz & López, “Las finanzas públicas,” 223.
46 Alarcón 91. Anexo K, 92 Anexo L.
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Table 11. Impuesto directo and education.47
Agencias de 
Hacienda 
Suma de 
impuesto que 
debe cobrar 
cada agente
Sumas que deben 
enviarse a la 
Admin. Gral. 
de Hcnda. para 
gastos de 
Instrucción 
pública
Cantidad a que 
ascienden los 
gastos que 
deben cubrirse 
en cada agencia
Sumas que 
deben dejarse 
en cada agen-
cia para pago 
de gastos
Remesas que 
deben hacerse a 
otras agencias
Sumas que 
deben remitir-
se a la Admin. 
Gral. de 
Hcnda.
Sumas que 
deben remi-
tirse por la 
Admin. Gral. 
de Hcnda.
Centro 13,856.80 3464.20 8748.15 8748.15 1644.45
Leiva 1053.50 263.30 138 138 652.20
Tundama 6353.60 1588.90 8265 4764.70
Paipa 6634.200 1658.50 900 900 3499.30 a 
Tundama
576.40
Norte 6080.90 1520 7774 4560.90 3213.10
Gutiérrez 3921.60 980.40 6003 2941.20 3061.80
Oriente 7130.30 1782.50 8346 5347.80 940.10
Garagoa 3333.40 833.30 442 442 2058.10 a 
Oriente
Occidente 5250.30 1312.50 5636 3937.80 1698.20
Chiquin-
quirá 7226.30 1806.50 5723 5419.80 303.20
Sugamuxi 5245.70 1311.40 7813.30 3934.30 1635.60
Pesca 3636.50 909.10 484 484 2243.40 a
 Sugamuxi
Total 69,723.10 17,430.60 7800.80 2873.05 10,852
This balance of ambition and caution disappeared when it came to projects embodying the 
belief that societal transformation was possible via industrial development. One example of this 
dynamic is in the way Boyacá was swept up in the wider enthusiasm for railroad construction. 
In the eastern highlands the passion for railroads was manifest largely in the enthusiasm for the 
Ferrocarril del Norte, a proposed line that would link Cundinamarca and neighboring states to 
the Magdalena River and ultimately the Caribbean coast. The plan, which included branch lines 
into Boyacá, had strong support among the radical politicians of the region.48 But this project 
was not even partially completed until the next century, and even then had little contact with 
Boyacá.
The second example, however, was a purely Boyacense affair, the long standing effort to 
build a Ferrería in Samacá. In this case the State government, seduced by visions of industrial 
modernization, directed scarce resources to this ambitious and ultimately unworkable effort. 
Attempts to build a Ferrería had begun in the 1850s without much success. The project gained 
47 El Boyacense, June 2, 1882.
48 See Salvador Camacho Roldán, “Ferrocarril del Norte,” Escritos Varios, volume 3, 31-90. For optimistic assess-
ments of how the Railroad would transform the region, see El Occidente, #1-9 (July-September 1873); and Me-
moria de Gobierno de Boyacá de 1874, 26.
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new life after José Eusebio Otálora assumed the State presidency in 1877.49 With support from 
the Federal regime, Tunja threw itself behind the project. Reports extolled the mineral wealth 
of the valley, proclaiming that the Ferrería would produce enough iron to supply railroad lines 
across the country, and other elements necessary for creating an industrial infrastructure. Both 
the Federal and State government poured money into the effort, which was overseen by for-
eign engineers. The state government established a private company, ceding to it control over 
the existing buildings, land, and mines, which it had purchased for 12,100 pesos. Further it 
loaned the company 75,000 pesos to be repaid at an interest rate of 5% over eight years. More-
over it was the largest investor in the company, purchasing 25 of the 125 offered shares at a 
cost of 25,000 pesos.50 The Federal government contributed 100,000 pesos.51
In a metaphor for the vaulting, but ultimately unfulfilled, visions of the era, the effort failed. 
Engineers determined that the existing buildings would not serve, and the company was dis-
solved. Tunja then backed an effort to build an entirely new, larger Ferrería.52 Reports docu-
menting problems with the construction, particularly the foundation of the central building, 
and difficulty with the foreign engineers, undermined support for this new effort.53 In the Me-
moria de Hacienda de 1881, Felipe Paúl lay part of the blame for the slow progress on the am-
bitious size of the project, and singled out Otálora for particular censure.54 In the Memoria de 
Hacienda of 1882, Salvador Camacho Roldán argued that Ferrería should be abandoned, and 
a Congressional commission submitted a report advising the same the following year.55 Otálo-
ra’s surprising ascension to the national presidency in 1882, after the death of Francisco Javier 
Zaldúa, temporarily prolonged efforts to salvage the doomed project.56 But even the support 
of the President of the nation could not save Ferrería. An 1884 report estimated that resuscitat-
ing the Ferrería would cost 50,000 pesos and it was abandoned later that year.57
49 Nepomuceno Rodríguez, Informe relativo a la ferrería de Samacá (Bogotá: Imprenta de Medardo Rívas, 1883), 5.
50 “Informe sobre la visita practicada por la comisión de la asamblea legislativa en la Ferrería de Samacá,” Docu-
ments relativos á la Ferrería de Samacá (Tunja: Imprenta de Torres Hermanos y compañía, 1879), 6; and “Con-
trato celebrado ente el doctor Antonio Roldan y el Señor Carlos Otto Brown,” Ibid, 13. Informe de la comisión 
nombrada para practicar una visita en la Ferrería de Samacá (Bogotá: Imprenta a cargo de H. Andrade, 1880), 
5. On Federal funding, see ley 36 de 1880, Memoria de Fomento de 1884, 91-92.
51 For claims the Ferrería would produce enough iron for railroads and bridges, see El Boyacense, February 11, 
1879. On the Federal Government providing 100,000 pesos in 1879, see Salvador Camacho Roldán, Memoria 
de Hacienda de 1881, 32. See pictures in Pinto Escobar, Progreso, industrialización y utopía, 37; and descriptions 
in El Boyacense, January 28, 1881.
52 Pinto Escobar, Progreso, industrialización y utopía, 31.
53 El Boyacense, September 28, 1881; November 5, 1881; and December 10, 1881. A particularly damning report 
from Thomas Nichols was published in El Diario de Cundinamarca, Pinto Escobar, Progreso, industrialización y 
utopía, 36-38.
54 Felipe Paúl, Memoria de Hacienda de 1881, 32.
55 Roldán, Memoria de Hacienda de 1882, 45-48; and Park, Rafael Núñez, 252-253.
56 Pinto Escobar, Progreso, industrialización y utopía, 38-40. Law 46 of 1882 set aside 5% of salt returns from Cun-
dinamarca to support the Ferrería, as well as another 5% for the Ferrocarril de Soto in Santander, El Boyacense, 
March 10, 1883.
57 Último informe relativo a la Ferrería de Samacá (Bogotá: Medardo Rivas, 1884).
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By 1887 the Government of Boyacá, forced to cover its debts by Federal law 40 of 1884, 
sought to recoup its investments by using the buildings as a textile factory.58 In 1889 the Fábri-
ca de Hilados y Tejidos of Samacá opened, a humbler example of industrial modernization than 
that envisioned during the Federal era. There are multiple ironies in this history. The first is that 
plans to resuscitate Boyacá’s declining textile industry with modern techniques had been for-
warded since the earliest days of the Republic, but it was not until the overwhelming failure 
in Samacá that they were realized.59 The second, is that the opening of the Fábrica coincided 
with the Regeneration, when the excesses of the Federal era were abandoned or undone. The 
Fererría serves as a metaphor for the failed ambitions of the Federal Republic. At a minimum, 
the State of Boyacá and the Federal Government both invested 100,000 pesos, though various 
estimates put the figure much higher. Considering that the reported gastos for Boyacá in 1877 
totaled 266,880 pesos, these were considerable quantities. That the government was willing to 
bear such costs demonstrates the depth of the support for economic development via modern-
ization in Boyacá.
This episode also demonstrates the degree that Boyacá was connected to and dependent 
upon the Federal regime. As noted above, some of the fluctuations in the State’s expected 
revenue involved Federal contributions. Many of the projects involving modernization or 
intended to foster the development of infrastructure were dependent on Federal funds. A 
notice in El Boyacense in late 1879 announced that the “Union” owed Boyacá $357,500 pe-
sos, “procedente de deudas contraidas por aquél y de auxilios decretados por el Congreso”.60 
Moreover, after the New Year the state expected a further 130,000 pesos from the national 
government.61 With these, “créditos del Estado contra la Nacion,” and the 24,000 owed to the 
State by the Compañía del Ferrocarril del Carare, the Hacienda would enter expected reve-
nue as the “extraordinarias,” 511,500 pesos. Such funds were no easier to collect, nor more 
dependable than the impuesto directo. The facile assertion that these figures should be in-
cluded in presupuestos de gastos for the following year were as illusory as the contemporary 
plans for a Ferrería that would produce enough steel to launch Colombian into modernity. 
58  El Boyacense, October 26, 1877. On starting a textile company, see AGN, SR, Gobernación de Boyacá #1, F. 107, 
208, January 1888. This effort took another decade and its modest success was overshadowed by the earlier 
failure, “After the disasters suffered by the various businesses in the iron works of Samacá, destroying almost 
completely the hopes that existed for its construction and the production, and when the valuable resources 
in that place are threatened with complete ruin, the idea to dedicate that establishment to another type of 
industry has been accepted,” Memoria de Gobierno de Boyacá de 1896, 58.
59 See such a proposal in a report from the intendente de Boyacá in 1830 Bernardino Soban that anticipated 
many of the schemes from later in the century. AGN, SR, Ministerio de Hacienda, legajo 254, ff. 445-46, July 
1830. 
60 The amount was broken down as follows, “Deuda de la Nación al Estado por la participación de éste en la 
renta de Salinas, 60,000 pesos; auxilio para la Carretera del Sur 25,000 pesos; auxilio para la construcción del 
Puente de Soto 10,000 pesos; auxilio para la construcción del monumento en el Puente de Boyacá 26,000 pe-
sos; auxilio para la mejora del Camino de Chontáles 10,000 pesos; auxilio para el fomento de empresas mate-
riales, con destino especial al Ferrocarril 200,000; suma adeudada del auxilio para la Carretera del Sur 24,500; 
auxilio para el Puente de Súnuba 2000, El Boyacense, December 2, 1879.
61 For the following: auxilio para la Ferrería 100,000 pesos; auxilio para gastos de viaje de familias de obreros 
20,000 pesos; lo causado á deber por la Nación por el derecho de Salinas, desde 1.o de Enero hasta 10 de Julio 
ultimo (aproximación) 10,000 pesos, Ibid.
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But they also suggest that the radicals of Boyacá were confident that the Federal government 
would repay the State’s political loyalty in very clear terms. It also explains how such a poor 
state could attempt so many costly projects.
Not all of these projects were as outlandish as the Ferrería. As demonstrated by the list above, 
much of the effort was directed toward improving Boyacá’s infrastructure through humbler 
projects. El Boyacense carried frequent references to contracts and plans for improving roads. 
The most important of these were the Camino de Occidente and the Camino del Sur, though 
even these practical projects tended to excite unrealistic schemes. In 1879 the government 
sought to create a company that would build a short railroad along the route of the Camino del 
Sur, from Tunja to Ventaquemada.62 In general, the Camino de Occidente, which would provide 
access to Moniquirá and Chinquinquirá, was a higher priority.63 This route not only promised 
access to the Magdalena, but bypassed Cundinamarca. While tensions with Cundinamarca and 
Santander were normally kept in check, at times the frustration with the former was evident, as 
when Felipe Pérez wrote:
Creo pues honorables diputados, llegado el momento de poner mano a la grande 
obra de la regeneración industrial del Estado: el camino de Occidente. Esa empresa ha-
bía sido hasta ahora un sueño, porque para abrirlo teníamos que contar con la volun-
tad extraña de Cundinamarca; … Ibamos pues a agotar nuestros recursos para una 
empresa nuestra al parecer, pero sujeta en un todo a los caprichos y a la legislación 
de otro soberano.64
A decade later, José Otálora informed the public about the dispute with the junta de caminos 
of Cundinamarca, which insisted on illegally taxing goods in transit, via Honda for Boyacá: 
Cundinamarca puede perder un poco del polvo de sus caminos, que traen acaso 
en los cascos las bestias conductoras de efectos fabricados en los Estados Unidos ó en 
Europea; pero en cambio recibe los ganados de Casanare, el batán, el azúcar, el taba-
co y el cacao de Santander, que pasan por territorio boyacense sin sufrir, en equitati-
va compensación de servicios, el gravamen odioso de las contribuciones de tránsito 
ó de peajes.65
62  Boletin de la Esposicion Nacional de Boyacá, June 2, 1879. (http://www.bibliotecanacional.gov.co/recursos_
user/hemerografico/ps19_boletinesposicion_junio_1879.pdf ). 
63  See La Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Soberano de Boyacá, Decreto de 14 de Noviembre de 1867 que promueve 
la apertura del camino de Occidente, in Terriorio Vásquez. Documentos sobre límites de los extinguidos Estados 
de Boyacá y Cundinamarca, Administración del Territorio, Camino de Occidente y Tierras baldías (Tunja: Imprenta 
del Departamento, 1912), 98-100.
64  Felipe Pérez, Informe del presidente F. Pérez, en 1870. Ensanche territorial y puerto sobre el rio Magdalena, Ibid, 
106. References to tension over the political dominance of Cundinamarca, which would prove so important in 
restoring Pérez’s rule in 1871, were sporadic but consistent. A letter to President Salgar in 1871 from Enrique 
Cortés describes a night spent with a party of armed insurgents who gave them a pamphlet decrying the in-
fluence of Cundinamarca over Boyacá, Archivo General de la Nación, Sección República, Ministerio de Gobier-
no #81, F. 487-489, September 1871.
65  See two pieces decrying this situation, El Boyacense, April 9, 1881, and June 8, 1881.
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While the government of Santander did not levy taxes on imports passing through the state, 
the route, via Lebrija and, presumably, the Sogamoso River, was too slow. Several thousand 
crates of goods necessary for industry, including the Fererría de Samacá, and educational mate-
rial were delayed in Cundinamarca by these machinations. A call for construction proposals for 
the Camino de Occidente noted that it would connect their rich highlands to the Magdalena, 
“pasando por territorio propio, redimiera de una vez y para siempre a Boyacá de tan oneroso tribu-
to.”66
The theme of Boyacense autonomy informed other projects intended to foster economic 
modernization. In 1874 the government investigated the possibility of establishing a state Bank. 
In presenting the relative benefits of a commercial bank against one that would write mortgag-
es, the author pointed out that both Cundinamarca and Santander had such institutions and 
argued that interest rates were high in Boyacá as a result, “Ya que empezamos a cultivar la inteli-
jencia, por medio de las escuelas; ya que empezamos a facilitar la movilización de las personas 
i el trasporte de las cosas, por medio de las vías de comunicación; empecemos a facilitar el ejer-
cicio de la industria, buscando los medios de conseguir los capitales que se necesitan.”67 As with 
many projects of the era, this did not prove an immediate success. 
Conclusion
The review of Boyacá’s fiscal history provides little to surprise those familiar with its history. 
Information on revenue and spending confirms what is normally assumed about the State’s 
stagnant economy, its particular place within the national political system, and the attempt by 
Liberal politicians to remake the region. The degree that Boyacá sought to trade its political loy-
alty for direct financial support from the Federal regime is striking. This is not an assertion that 
Boyacense Liberals were not sincere supporting the Federal regime, merely an observation that 
the relationship between those in control of the state and the Federal government was com-
plex and went beyond formal politics. The rulers of Boyacá expected the Federal government to 
provide material support for their schemes to transform society and they received assurances 
that this support would be provided, though Boyacá did not always make good on these prom-
ises. Further, the relationship with the Federal regime did not preclude tension with the state of 
Cundinamarca.
Perhaps the most useful point of this survey is to highlight specific questions that need to 
be addressed in the relatively underdeveloped historiography of Boyacá: the workings of pop-
66 El Boyacense, September 1, 1881. For a call for bids the following year, see Ibid, January 12, 1882. See, for ex-
ample, the notice on Law 21, 1882, passed on November 29, permitting the State President to concede privi-
leges to those seeking to open, “nuevas vías de comunicación, construir puentes, …,” Ibid, December 9, 1882.
67 The author claimed the result was Boyacenses paid between 18 and 24% interest on loans rather than the 
12 to 15% that was the norm in the neighboring States. J. del C. Rodríguez claimed, “Comisión de revisión del 
proyecto de lei “sobre establecimiento de Bancos,” El Boyacense, October 17, 1874. This effort continued in the 
1880s. See a notice from June 1881 from Manuel María Fajardo and Ricardo Vargas V., calling for a sociedad 
anónima to back the bank, El Boyacense, June 4, 1881, and June 9, 1881. A following notice advised the group 
sought to sell 200 shares to raise 40,000 pesos, claiming the State government had purchased twenty shares, 
Otálora had purchased five; and other notables were participating, so that 25,000 pesos had already been 
raised, Ibid, July 14, 1881.
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ular politics and the interplay with a more precise understanding of the mechanisms of Liberal 
political control, the nature of provincial variation in the state, and the economic history of the 
state during the Regeneration. These questions aside the review of Boyacá’s fiscal history also 
documents how closely Boyacense history matched the contours of the national history, with 
the exception that the state had no incipient economic sector on the point of achieving suc-
cess. Even what became one of its most important economic successes, the Fábrica de Tejidos, 
was founded after the passage of the Constitution of 1886, an apt metaphor for the frustrated 
ambitions of the era.
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